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A VALUE ANALYSIS OF GHANAIAN LEGAL
DEVELOPMENT SINCE INDEPENDENCE
WILLIAM BuRNETr HARVEY *
MR. Chairman, My Lords, Your Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen:
Before turning to my subject, I would beg your indulgence for a few
very personal words. As I approach the end of my first year in
the University of Ghana, I am encouraged by the significant develop-
ment in legal education which has occurred. In this, many people
have played important roles, but two groups merit special mention.
The first of these is the General Legal Council of Ghana. The
Council is a statutory body including all of the justices of the
Supreme Court, the Attorney-General, certain appointees of
the Minister of Justice and the Chief Justice, and representatives
elected by the Ghana Bar Association. In my capacity as Dean of
the Faculty of Law I have the honour of serving with this able and
dedicated group which has been charged by Parliament with a wide
range of responsibility for legal education, admission to the Bar of
Ghana, and the good government of the legal profession. An
important ingredient in the success of any law faculty is the
confidence and support it receives from the leaders of the Bench
and Bar. The General Legal Council, representing every segment
of the profession in Ghana, has been generous and unfailing in
support of the Law Faculty of the University. I would therefore,
with respect, pay full tribute to all members of the Council, and
especially to its distinguished Chairman, Sir Arku Korsah, Chief
Justice of Ghana.
The members of the Faculty of Law as well deserve full recogni-
tion for the vital part each has played in our work. In this period
when the tasks to be performed have so completely challenged the
human and physical resources at our disposal, they have laboured
well for the present and built solidly for the future. The capacities
and scholarly integrity of these men have placed this Faculty in the
forefront of legal education in Africa: Nii Amaa Ollennu, Robert
Seidman, Samuel Asante, Kwame Afreh, William Ekow Daniels,
Thomas Rose, Joseph Agyemang and Kwasi Gyeke-Dako. A time-
honoured tradition provides me the opportunity to address you on
• The author was formerly Dean of the Faculty of Law, University of Ghana. The
text is the inaugural lecture delivered in the Lecture Theatre, Commonwealth
Hall, University of Ghana, on May 24, 1963.
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this occasion. The honour you pay the Faculty of Law by your
presence here this evening, however, is equally due to each of these
men whom I am privileged to have as both colleague and friend.
TiH CONCEPT OF LAW
I shall speak to you this evening about certain aspects of the law of
Ghana. If we are to avoid confusion in discussing law, it is essential
at the inception that we specify our meaning of this central concept.
The nature of law has been a perennial problem of jurisprudence,
and a preoccupation with it has doubtless contributed much to the
tedium of the subject. Thurman Arnold once observed that "most
of the literature of jurisprudence . . . is tedious, not as hard subjects
like physics and mathematics are tedious, but as throwing feathers,
endlessly, hour after hour, is tedious." 1 Without being, I hope,
more than necessarily tedious, I shall indicate briefly what I mean
when I speak of law.
For many of its votaries, law involves some essential order of
values. These values may make positive demands for implementation
by the manipulation of public force or may play only a negative role,
setting the outer boundaries beyond which the public force may not
go. In this view, any enactment not serving the postulated values
would not be law. To others, law, as such, is value-neutral, being
merely a technique of social ordering available for use in support
of any value judgment that the manipulators of the technique
entertain. In this view the technique finds its essential identification
in an ultimate reliance on the organised force of a society. I am
of this latter mind. Like most men, I could, if called upon, suggest
those values which represent my preferences or my strongly-held
convictions of what a decent life requires. At the same time I must
recognise that many men do not share my preferences, and a number
of legal orders do not protect my fundamental decencies. Neverthe-
less, I recognise the apartheid enactments of South Africa, which I
abhor, as law in as full a sense as the prohibitions of racial
discrimination in American legislation, which I strongly support.
It is unnecessary here to offer further explanation or defence of
this completely instrumental conception of law. Even those who
reject it or in some way limit it will nevertheless recognise, I believe,
that its use can open wide ranges of fruitful social inquiry. In any
society those who manipulate the technique, which I call law, reflect
their value judgments as they select the purposes or ends in aid
of which the technique will be used. As a mere hypothesis at this
.1 Arnold, "Institute Priests and Yale Observers-A Reply to Dean Goodrich"
(1936) 84 U. of Pa.L.Rev. 811.
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stage, I would offer the suggestion that the values selected for
implementation through the systematic application of public force
rank high in the hierarchy of goods perceived by those able to
commit the force. Thus, if the data in the legal storehouse are
carefully studied and analysed, one should be able to outline the
organising values of a society and to sense at least the tension points
at which the muscular pull of change challenges the bony commit-
ments to the past.
It is within this conceptual framework that I propose to examine
briefly certain developments in the law of Ghana since independence.
First, these developments will be described and analysed in their
purely positivistic dimensions. It will then be possible to consider
their value implications.
LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS SINCE INDEPENDENCE
Constitutional changes
The transfer of sovereignty from the United Kingdom to an
independent Ghana on March 6, 1957, brought changes of profound
significance in the legal order. Most obvious of these, of course,
was the transfer of full power over and responsibility for the
management of the public force to African hands. Less obvious
but equally significant were the developments, some brought into
operation on independence and some occurring thereafter, by which
legal power was structured and allocated among the various organs
within the new state.
Through most of history the people who lived in the area of
modem Ghana were little influenced toward unity by either their
indigenous leaders or the Europeans. Even when the European
presence on the Guinea Coast was no longer dispersed in national
economic rivalries, British administration of the Gold Coast dealt
with the Colony, Ashanti and the Northern Territories as discrete
units. Until 1946, when the Bums Constitution 2 included five
Ashanti members in the Legislative Council sitting in Accra, the
law-making function for Ashanti was totally in the British Governor
and imperial agencies. Representation from the Northern Territories
in the central legislative body did not come until the Coussey
Constitution of 1950.3 Thus until virtually the eve of independence
the colonial power deferred basic steps which might have fostered
in the British dependencies of the Gold Coast some greater preception
of interrelation.
2 The Gold Coast Colony and Ashanti (Legislative Council) Order in Council
(S.R. & 0. 1946 No. 353), 1948, Vol. IX, 673.
3 The Gold Coast (Constitution) Order in Council (S.I. 1950 No. 2094).
William Burnett Harvey
British colonial policy, as formally announced, attempted to
nurture and support the institutions of indigenous government. In
southern and central Ghana these found their characteristic expres-
sions in the small Akan state, the independent town or village of
the Ga-Adangbe people, and the Ewe division. While various
combinations of these units were formed from time to time, largely
for military purposes, no stable grouping ever emerged except in
Ashanti. There, under the leadership of the Paramount Chief of
Kumasi, as Asantehene, a powerful military confederation was
formed, but civil government remained almost exclusively a function
of the constituent states. Nevertheless the sense of a larger regional
identification which developed early in Ashanti played an important
role in the processes by which public power in independent Ghana
was later to be structured.
As has been noted, constitutional changes in 1946 and 1950
forged some links between the Colony, Ashanti and the Northern
Territories, but the rapid drive toward independence brought into
sharp focus the basic lack of a common identification within the
new country.
The Reports of the Watson Commission 4 in 1948 and of the
Coussey Committee 5 in 1949 considered not only reforms in
the constitutional structure of the central government but also the
allocation of powers and functions among regional and local units.
Both of these Reports recommended a substantial decentralisation,
but the underlying theory throughout was that regional administra-
tions were to be merely agents of the central government exercising
such powers and functions as might be defined by legislation. With
the organisation of the National Liberation Movement in September
1954, however, the nature of the debate over the structuring of the
Independence Constitution and the status of regional organs under-
went a significant change. The issue was no longer the rational
allocation of functions between a supreme central government and
its regional agents; the issue raised was the very nature and power
of the central government itself.
The constitutional platform of the N.L.M. was federalism, a
division of powers and functions between the central government and
regional agencies, each of which would have its constitutionally
defined areas of competence. It is noteworthy that the N.L.M. had
its greatest support in Ashanti, where the Confederation had fostered
a strong regional loyalty. The Convention Peoples Party, on the
4 Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Disturbances in the Gold Coast, 194A,
Colonial No. 231 (H.M.S.O. 1948).
5 Report to His Excellency the Governor by the Committee on Constitutional
Reform, 1949, Colonial No. 248 (H.M.S.O. 1949).
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other hand, did not oppose some dispersion of governmental
functions among regional organs, but its central conviction on the
constitutional allocation of power was unwavering: the central
government must be supreme.
It is unnecessary now to review in detail the work of Sir Frederick
Bourne, who as Constitutional Adviser rejected federalism,' the
parliamentary elections demanded by the British Government to
determine the extent of popular support for C.P.P. views, or the
last-minute negotiations of Mr. Lennox-Boyd, the Secretary of State
for the Colonies, seeking a reconciliation of the competing views.
The Independence Constitution I itself was a compromise, though
in the main the views of the Convention People's Party prevailed.
The Constitution required that Parliament should establish in each
of the five regions of Ghana a regional assembly to exercise effective
powers in the fields of local government, agriculture, animal health,
forestry, education, communications, medical and health services,
public works, town and country planning, housing, police and such
others as Parliament might determine. Within each of these fields,
however, the Constitution made quite clear the supremacy of the
central government as well as the fact that any specific power or
function in the several fields could devolve on the regional assemblies
only by Act of Parliament.
The only constitutionally assured function of the regional
assemblies was to review certain kinds of proposed legislation with
the possibility of exercising a qualified veto. In certain areas
Parliament could legislate only by a procedure which included
approval by two-thirds of the regional assemblies, including any
assembly directly affected. These specially protected areas included
the modification of those provisions of the Constitution which
defined the basic governmental structure and the public service,
guaranteed regional organisations and chieftaincy, and assured
compensation on the compulsory acquisition of property. The
same procedure was required for any bill abolishing or suspending
any regional assembly or diminishing its powers or functions. Other
provisions of the Constitution were designed to protect the territorial
integrity of the regions from action by the central government.
Thus it can be said that the constitutional order with which
Ghana achieved independence reflected a variety of local loyalties
and considerable suspicion of unified national authority. No initiative
for legal or governmental developments was given to sub-national
bodies, however; their constitutional function was entirely negative-
s Report of the Constitutional Adviser (Government Printer, Accra, 1955).
7 The Ghana (Constitution) Order in Council (S.I. 1957 No. 277).
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to check, delay or prevent certain kinds of action by the central
government.
At the time of independence, no regional assemblies existed.
These were later established by the Regional Assemblies Act of
1958,8 their functions being limited to advising and making recom-
mendations to Ministers of the central government. The constitutive
Act does not make it entirely clear whether a regional assembly
might take the initiative in giving advice and making recommenda-
tions or whether even this function was to be performed only on
ministerial request. Nor did the assemblies themselves survive long
enough to permit experience to define more fully their role in
national life.
There is little reason at this time to speculate on the course of
development that might have occurred if the opposition political
groups had not decided to boycott the first regional assembly elections
in 1958. That decision was in fact taken, and only candidates for
the Convention People's Party stood for election. Thereafter with
C.P.P. forces fully in control of both the central government and
the regional assemblies, and against the background of recurrent
political boycott by opposition groups, it is hardly surprising that
steps were taken immediately to consolidate governmental power at
the centre. In December 1958 Parliament passed an Act to repeal
the constitutional restrictions on its power which had required the
assent of regional bodies for amendment of the Constitution and
certain other purposes." In accordance with the constitutional
requirement being repealed, this Act was approved by the regional
assemblies. The clear legislative supremacy of Parliament, thus
established, was almost immediately exercised in the repeal of the
Regional Assemblies Act and the dissolution of the existing
assemblies.1"
The legal framework of national unity thus seemed complete.
Nevertheless, the Government in submitting to the people in 1960
a White Paper on a republican constitution asked for a further
mandate to maintain the unity of Ghana. This was given, and the
present Constitution declares that Ghana is a "sovereign unitary
Republic." 11 Only by a popular referendum can the unitary and
republican form of government be altered.
Less dramatic than the constitutional structuring of unified
national power, but in many ways as important, have been the
statutory enactments by which local government has been reorganised
s Act No. 25 of 1958.
9 The Constitution (Repeal of Restrictions) Act, 1958, No. 38 of 1958.
10 The Constitution (Amendment) Act, 1959 (No. 7 of 1959).
11 Republican Constitution, art. 4.
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and related to the centre. It is possible here only to summarise
these developments. A much fuller analysis of the evolving formal
structure is needed, supported by thorough empirical studies of
these institutions of government which stand closest to the ordinary
citizen in his daily life.
On the eve of responsible African government in the Gold Coast,
local government powers and functions were vested in Native
Authorities created by order of the Governor.12 While the legislation
authorising establishment of the Authorities made it entirely clear
that designation depended on the fiat of the central government and
not on chiefly status as such, the Colonial Government in general
followed the practice of designating as the Native Authority for an
area a chief and his council. Since the same persons also functioned
as the State Councils in the various states of the traditional order,
it was often difficult to determine the capacity in which they acted
in taking a particular step. The Native Authorities system did not
work well, and even the Coussey Committee, on which the traditional
authorities had strong representation, conceded in 1949 that "the
existing system of local government has proved unable to meet
the requirements of an efficient and democratic administration." "
The correctives applied by the central government since 1951 have
related directly to the structure of local government; they have also
affected profoundly the status and functions of the traditional
authorities themselves.
Local government
Almost the first major piece of legislation enacted under
Dr. Nkrumah's Government was the Local Government Ordinance
of 1951.14 It authorised the creation and grant of local government
functions to Local, Urban and District Councils on which popularly
elected members would ordinarily constitute a two-thirds majority.
The remaining one-third were to be appointees of the traditional
authorities. The performance of the new councils was disappointing,
in large part because many were established on the geographical
base of small, traditional states which possessed neither the popula-
tion nor the resources to permit them to organise local services
12 The relevant legislation for the several administrative divisions was found in
Native Authority (Colony) Ordinance, No. 21 of 1944; Native Authority (Ashanti)
Ordinance, No. 10 of 1935; Native Authority (Northern Territories) Ordinance,
No. 2 of 1932; Native Authority (Southern Section of Togoland under British
Mandate) Ordinance, No. 7 of 1949.
13 Gold Coast: Report to His Excellency the Governor by the Committee on
Constitutional Reform, 1949, p. 14, Colonial No. 248 (1949).
14 No. 29 of 1951.
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effectively."5 In 1959, the Government introduced corrective legis-
lation; the old District Councils were abolished, and on ministerial
orders many of the small Local Councils were consolidated into
larger units."6 At the same time, the members of all councils who
had been appointed by the traditional authorities were eliminated,
and all local government bodies became entirely elective.' 7  The
present scheme of local government, organised under the post-republic
Local Government Act of 1961,'8 involves about sixty-five urban
and local bodies which are supervised and related to the central
government by administrative personnel responsible in each region
,to a Regional Commissioner, a political functionary with the rank
of Minister to whom certain local government functions are delegated
by the Minister of Local Government. In this scheme, the tradi-
tional, sacred and local repositories of authority and responsibility
have been definitively replaced by elective, secular organs related
to the national centre under articulated criteria of rationality and
efficiency.
INTERACTION OF ENGLISH LAW WITH CUSTOMARY LAW
The pre-republican system
Turning now from the formal structures of public power, within
and through which legal force is directed and applied, let us consider
the evolving content of the legal norms themselves. In the first
instance it is desirable to consider this matter at the general level.
Specific enactments may be considered later.
A cardinal feature of the legal order inherited by Ghana from
the United Kingdom was a pervasive dualism, that is, a body of law
derived from the colonial power and applied in a discrete system
of courts co-existed with a body or bodies of indigenous or customary
law applied mainly in a system of so-called Native Courts. In order
to avoid chaos some scheme was necessary to delimit the sphere of
operation of each body of law and each system of courts and, in
so far as these spheres coincided or conflicted, to determine which
should prevail.
The general standards defining the relations between English-
derived law and customary law in the pre-independence Gold Coast
were posited by the imperial power in the Courts Ordinance of 1935.11
These standards employed two different techniques for relating the
15 See the Report of the Commissioner for Local Government Inquiries, June 1957
(Accra 1960).
16 The Local Government (Amendment) Act, 1959 (No. 14 of 1959).
17 This was effected for the Municipal Councils of the larger cities by the Municipal
Councils (Abolition of Traditional Members) Act, 1959 (No. 15 of 1959).
Is Act 54 of 1961.
19 No. 7 of 1935.
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different categories of legal norms. The first, which can be called
the technique of horizontal ordering, involved the assignment of
discrete areas of application to each set of norms in the system. The
second, which we will refer to as vertical or hierarchical ordering,
related the bodies of law and applying courts as superiors and
inferiors. While both these techniques were used in the pre-
independence Gold Coast to relate the norms of English-derived law
and those of customary law, there was an ultimate resort to
hierarchical ordering, that is, the imperial power defined the hierarchy
itself and assigned to each set of norms its areas of application.
The elements of English-derived law applicable in the Gold,
Coast, briefly listed in the order in which they would prevail in any
case of conflict among them, were imperial laws expressly applicable
in the Gold Coast or brought into effect there by Order in Council,
ordinances enacted by the local legislative body, statutes of general
application which had been in force in England on July 24, 1874,
doctrines of equity and finally rules of the common law. Clearly
reflected in this hierarchy are the idea of legislative supremacy and
the moderating influence of English equity. It should be observed
also that an historical test determined the reception of English
statutes of general application. The use of such a test created a
number of troublesome mechanical problems for the Gold Coast
lawyer attempting to find the local law and also tended to preserve
in the Gold Coast legal norms which had been changed or abolished
by reform legislation in England.
This body of English-derived law coexisted with a number of
bodies of customary law in force in various parts of the Gold Coast.
The relations between the two systems were defined by a horizontal
order whose criteria were primarily ethnic. In causes to which the
parties were "natives," the primary law presumptively applicable
was customary law. A "native" could lose the benefit of customary
law, however, if it appeared either from an express contract or by
implication from the nature of the transaction out of which the
question arose that he had agreed to have his obligations regulated
exclusively by English law. On the other hand, if the parties to the
cause included both "natives" and "non-natives," English law was
presumed to control. This presumption was rebuttable, however,
and the courts were authorised to apply customary law if they
determined that "substantial injustice would be done to either party
by a strict adherence to the rules of English law."
Even within the areas thus assigned to it, customary law was
not supreme, but was hierarchically related to certain limiting
principles. Customary law could be applied in any court only in so
far as it was not "repugnant to natural justice, equity and good
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conscience" or "incompatible either directly or by necessary
implication with any ordinance." These limiting criteria were
interpreted and applied by the courts, in the main, by the superior
courts staffed principally by English personnel, though it was, of
course, possible for a Native Court to exclude customary law on
such grounds.
The formidable range of problems arising in the administration
of this pluralistic legal order can only be suggested here. Some
problems arose out of the interpretation of the provisions of the
Courts Ordinance itself. Did the cut-off date in 1874 which clearly
limited the reception of English statutes of general application apply
to English common law and equity as well? What is a statute of
general application? May parts of a statute be of general applica-
tion and thus received, though other parts clearly are not? In what
circumstances would an agreement between "natives" that customary
law should not govern be implied? In what circumstances would
the court's perception of injustice foreclose the application of English
law where not all parties to the case were "natives "? Many
questions such as these were not fully and satisfactorily answered
before the Courts Ordinance itself was finally repealed.
Some of the most difficult problems arose in ascertaining the
customary law when the general hierarchy of norms indicated its
applicability. This was, of course, less a problem in the Native
Courts, where the members were presumed to know the custom and
could apply it on the basis of their own knowledge, than in the
superior courts whose judges were actually forbidden to rely on such
knowledge of customary law as their prior experience might provide.
In the superior courts, therefore, a party relying on customary law
was required to plead and prove it. While the Judicial Committee
of the Privy Council had recognised the possibility of the courts'
taking judicial notice of certain customs which had become notorious
through frequent proof,"0 this means of avoiding the inconvenience
and difficulty of extended proof was not in fact utilised by the
courts.2 Proof of the customary law continued to be offered in
the form of authoritative books or manuscripts, such as the work
of John Mensah Sarbah on Fanti law, or by the testimony of chiefs,
linguists or others who could be qualified as experts.
The proof of customary law -in each case by the introduction of
evidence may certainly be criticised on the grounds of inconvenience
and expense. The method also touched the sensitive nerve of
emergent national pride, since to require proof by witnesses suggested
that customary law was not real law but merely an operative fact.
20 Angu v. Attah (1915) Gold Coast Privy Council Judgments, 1874-1928, p. 43.
21 See Amissah v. Krabah (1931) 2 W.A.C.A. 30.
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Yet there were advantages in the method. The strongest claim to
respect which customary law can make is that it reflects the consensus
of the community as manifested in actual usage. In the constant
flux of society such usage will change. Proof of the customary law
on a case by case basis, therefore, should provide the maximum
assurance that the law applied will keep in step with the changing
life of the people. There is surely less certainty that this will occur
if customary law is established by judicial notice of what has been
proved in earlier cases, or by the binding declarations of traditional
councils, another method authorised by Gold Coast legislation.2
The grant of independence to Ghana in 1957 did not alter in
detail the order of legal norms just described. To be sure, the
supreme position in the hierarchy was occupied after March 6, 1957,
by the constitutional Order in Council rather than imperial legislation
of the British Parliament. Otherwise the pre-independence body of
law was left intact.
Re-organisation since the Republican Constitution
(1) New doctrine of stare decisis. The most important revisions
in the hierarchy of legal norms of Ghana became effective on the
creation of the Republic on July 1, 1960. These deserve careful
analysis in detail, but here we can do no more than suggest changes
which may prove to be especially significant.
First, the Republican Constitution contains a novel set of
provisions dealing with the cardinal feature of a common law system,
that is, the doctrine of precedent or stare decisis.23 The doctrine
itself is not, of course, a new arrival in Ghana. During the colonial
period the courts in the Gold Coast were bound by the decisions of
the West African Court of Appeal and of the Judicial Committee
of the Privy Council. On the other hand, decisions of the English
Court of Appeal and the House of Lords were in theory not binding
but in practice were treated as if they were. On the advent of the
Republic, the possibility of appeal to the Privy Council was
eliminated and the Supreme Court of Ghana became the tribunal of
final resort. Thus the question was posed-what effect in republican
Ghana would be attributed to pre-republican decisions of the Supreme
Court and of various English tribunals.
Article 42 of the Republican Constitution speaks to this question
with superficial clarity:
"The Supreme Court shall in principle be bound to follow its
own previous decisions on questions of law, and the High Court
22 See, for example, the Native Law and Custom (Ashanti Confederacy Council)
Ordinance, No. 4 of 1940.
23 Republican Constitution, art. 42 (4).
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shall be bound to follow previous decisions of the Supreme Court
on such questions, but neither court shall be otherwise bound to
follow the previous decisions of any court on questions of law."
This article appears to be an unequivocal declaration of independence
for the superior courts in so far as the decisions of non-Ghanaian
courts are concerned. The stability of legal institutions and the
relative conservatism of judicial attitudes, however, make it inevitable
that English decisions will enjoy for a long time a high degree of
persuasiveness in Ghana. One may hope nevertheless that the
Supreme Court and High Court will not be reluctant to re-examine
long-established English precedents to determine their responsiveness
to the developing needs of this country.
When one turns from the status of foreign decisions to the
functioning of the doctrine of stare decisis within the present judicial
hierarchy of Ghana, much of the certainty in article 42 disappears.
If only the decisions of the Supreme Court are in the future to be
binding, what is the "Supreme Court" for this purpose? Is the
court as constituted under the Republican Constitution to be deemed
to be a new court, so that only decisions under the Republic are
fully authoritative? Or is a theory of antecedent and continuing
existence to be applied? If the court is deemed to have had a
pre-republic existence, how far back in time will its earlier life be
traced-back to independence in 1957 or some earlier date? These
questions remain unanswered.
Even with respect to decisions of the Republican Supreme Court,
the stringency of the commitment to stare decisis is unclear. In
Great Britain the view now prevails that the House of Lords is
absolutely bound by its own prior decisions. If the ravages of time
render their principles disfunctional to social needs or the demands
of justice, the Lords are incapable of applying correctives other than
through the technical creation of distinctions. Any outright over-
ruling of established doctrine requires an Act of Parliament. Does
the Republican Constitution of Ghana commit the Supreme Court
to such futility in the face of its earlier decisions which may call
for modification? Arguably an affirmative answer is required, since
article 42 declares that the "Supreme Court shall in principle be
bound to follow its own previous decisions on questions of law."
In this provision, however, the key words seem to be "in principle."
If they mean only that nothing in a case shall bind except its
"principle," the words are patently redundant. Not even the most
devoted adherent to stare decisis has ever suggested that any aspect
of a case is binding other than its "principle" or ratio decidendi.
If one assumes, therefore, that the constitutional fathers did not
intend a redundancy, what purpose do the words "in principle"
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serve? I would suggest that they might be taken to mean "in
general" or "ordinarily." If so interpreted, the stringent English
doctrine of precedent would not prevail in Ghana by constitutional
mandate.
These questions do not represent a mere academic exercise. They
go to the heart of the role of the judiciary in keeping the tension
between stable legal institutions and social needs and values within
tolerable limits. It seems to me at least doubtful that legislative
bodies in most countries today have either the time or the interest
for making those periodic adjustments in established doctrine that
social change may demand. Within rather broad limits I think the
courts are the agencies best equipped to perform this function. I
would therefore hope that the Supreme Court of Ghana in inter-
preting the Constitution and defining its own role in the processes
of legal change will shun English judicial passivity and claim for
itself a more affirmative, creative function.
(2) The place o1 customary law. The second significant change
in the structure of legal norms effected on the creation of the
Republic has to do with the status of customary law. It will be
recalled that in the older order there was an initial presumption
that customary law was applicable in any case between "natives,"
and, in causes between "natives" and "non-natives," it applied if
the court concluded that injustice would result to either party
through the strict application of English law. The Courts Act of
196012 makes an understandable effort to avoid such an ethnic
criterion for determining the applicable legal rules. The details of
this effort need not concern us here. It suffices to observe that the
old starting presumption of the applicability of customary law has
been replaced by a presumption that common law prevails. This
presumption is, of course, rebuttable, but any person who wants
his cause controlled by customary law must act affirmatively to
establish to the satisfaction of the court that there is a relevant rule
under some body of custom that the person can claim as his
"personal law."
The term "common law" has a much broader inclusion under
the Republican legislation 25 than the older English usage would
suggest. It includes the traditional common law rules, the doctrines
of equity, the English statutes of general application which had been
in force in Ghana immediately before the Republic,"' and any rules
24 C.A. 9, s. 66.
25 The Interpretation Act of 1960, C.A. 4, s. 17 (1).
26 Technically these statutes are not part of the common law but are to be treated
as part thereof. For the provisions which somewhat circuitously retain the
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of customary law which may be assimilated because of their suit-
ability for general application. Thus the common law which now
enjoys an initial presumption of applicability need not be entirely
the English law which has been received but may include as well
certain rules of customary origin.
The procedures by which customary law rules may be assimilated
into the common law of Ghana are provided by the Chieftaincy Act
of 1961.7 They have not yet in fact been used, and no customary
rule has yet been assimilated. It would now be hazardous indeed
to attempt to predict the future of this assimilation technique. Even
should it be employed frequently, the resulting common law rule of
customary origin would differ basically from the traditional customary
law. Common law is national, while customary law is essentially
local. Common law is built around the stabilising frame of stare
dedsis, while customary law reflects more directly the evolving life
of the community. Thus, to bring into the common law the customs
of some particular community does not merely alter the term by
which they are described. Their scope of application and their future
treatment in the legal order are also basically changed.
PROGRAMME OF LAW REFORM
The third significant development in the legal order of Ghana can
only be suggested here. Adequate discussion of it would require
several substantial volumes. This is the major programme of
legislative reform which was begun in 1960. Mention has already
been made of the fact that much of the applicable legislation in
Ghana had been received from the United Kingdom as of July 24,
1874. Once received, this legislation was unaffected by later reforms
in Britain which altered or repealed it domestically. Equally
important was the fact that some major legislative innovations in
Britain were never made applicable to the Gold Coast or Ghana.
Since the creation of the Republic, a sweeping attack has been
made on these legislative inadequacies. Much of the old received
legislation has been repealed, thus clearing the ground for new
building. Measures which have stood the test of time and still seem
appropriate in Ghana's circumstances have been put into modem
language and re-enacted by Parliament. Some partial codifications
have been attempted, as in the Contracts Act of 1960.25 In some
instances legislative efforts have been preceded by major studies
English statutes of general application in force on July 24, 1874, and provide for
their treatment as part of the common law, see the Courts Act, C.A. 9, s. 154 (4);
Republican Constitution, Act 40; and the Interpretation Act, C.A. 4, s. 17 (3).
27 Act 81, s. 62 (2).
28 Act 25.
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which examined the relevant problems in depth and proposed
solutions. Such a study 29 by Professor L. C. B. Gower, then of
the London School of Economics, has produced a Companies Code
Bill. Another by a commission under the chairmanship of Mr. Albert
Adomakoh led to draft proposals 10 for an Insolvency Bill and
another on Companies Liquidation. A new Criminal Code and Code
of Criminal Procedure have been enacted. Many more examples
could be cited.
Relatively little of the reform legislation has been radical in its
innovation. It seems quite clear that English and Irish models have
been preferred, though on occasion American experience has been
examined and solutions found workable there adopted." In general,
the approach has been pragmatic and eclectic. The quality of drafts-
manship, particularly in the earlier Acts, has been high, though it
must be said that the Marriage, Divorce and Inheritance Bill which
the Government has promulgated for public criticism appears to
represent the nadir of the draftsman's art. In fact, however, one is
inclined to suspect that the inadequacies of this Bill arise from
uncertainty and hesitation at the policy level which not even the
most skilled draftsman could overcome.
Time presses further discussion of legal developments themselves.
The remainder of my remarks will be directed toward an axiological
examination of the major changes in the legal order of Ghana since
independence. Against the limited background available, conclusions
must, of course, be highly tentative. Nevertheless, an examination
of legal institutions with a view to their guiding value assumption
can be most revealing of certain powerful forces that, with others,
trace the vector of social change.
No legal order with which I have any familiarity reflects a single,
totally consistent scheme of values. Rather, the law usually reflects
a number of antinomies, most of them recurrent in the various
systems. For example, the law of the United States, which is
frequently pictured as the last bastion of capitalistic individualism,
reveals to even the most casual observer an extensive pattern of
regulation in the public interest, that is, legal norms oriented mainly
to the values of the community. In the Soviet Union on the other
hand, the new economic policy of the 1920s did not exhaust the
need to recognise more fully in the law and other official action
the value of the individual, his personality and creativity. By and
29 Final Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Working and Administration
of the present Company Law of Ghana, Accra, 1961.
30 Report of the Commissioners Appointed to Inquire into the Insolvency Law
of Ghana, Accra, 1961.
31 For example, see the provisions relating to third party beneficiary contracts in
the Contracts Act, 1960 (Act 25), ss. 5-6.
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large, therefore, the axiological analyst sketches a value profile of a
particular society by locating the critical fulcrum points where the
weight of a certain value acceptance counterbalances its antinomic
companion.
The value of nationhood
In the evolution of the law of Ghana over the past decade, the
value of nationhood has been dominant. I use the term "nation-
hood" rather than "nationalism" in order to emphasise that the
effort through legal, political and social means has been to create
the perception of a new value and to organise its expression
internally rather than to implement externally a set of developed and
articulated national aims. The legacy of the colonial era to Ghana
was a collection of separate territorial units having some important
ethnic, economic and cultural differences and with little perception of
the bonds which might draw them together. Since the advent
of responsible African government, legal devices and techniques have
been consistently used to neutralise sub-national power centres,
particularly the traditional authorities, and to organise all legitimate
power on a national basis. This is seen clearly in the successful
struggle for a unified and not a federal government, in the concentra-
tion in Parliament of plenary sovereignty, except where expressly
limited by a reservation of power to the entire people. It is seen
also in the revisions of the legal structure of local government, and
in an important course of legislation we have not had time to discuss
whereby the chiefs have been deprived of independent economic
power. 2 It is manifested as well in the constant pressure on
customary law, with all its local variations, in favour of a uniform
body of national common and statute law.
While nationhood has thus far been the dominant value, the
voice of a competitor has also been heard in the land. This is
the continental thunder of Africa or, at least, of a larger unity which
can erase some of the grosser irrationalities of the national boundaries
bequeathed by colonialism. In the main that thunder has been
remote, but it has been constant. Its sharpest peal thus far sounds
in the Republican Constitution which authorises Parliament to
surrender the sovereignty of Ghana to a union of African states
and territories."3 At the political level, though thus far not perceptibly
at the legal, it appears also in efforts to forge a meaningful union of
Ghana, Guinea and Mali.
32 I have reference to the various measures by which stool lands and other stool
resources have been brought under national administration.
33 Republican Constitution, art. 2.
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One of the most persistent value competitions in legal theory
and in the practical orientation of a legal order is that between the
individual and the community. In the traditional orders of the Gold
Coast, like most of Africa, the community represented the dominant
value. The basic unit of social, political and legal life was the
family, and legal institutions gave it a high degree of protection.
While the evolving legal order of Ghana is certainly not directed
by rampant individualism, -it seems quite clear that a shift in favour
of individual values has occurred. Political power is structured on
a one man--one vote basis.34 At both the local and national levels,
the new structure vests governmental powers and functions in elective
bodies, leaving the traditional authorities, grounded on collective-
family units, only a ritual significance. One of the most direct
manifestations of this indivualising process is the new Marriage,
Divorce and Inheritance Bill, whose provisions on inheritance strike
deep toward the legal roots which support the extended family.
Others can be found in many of the major pieces of reform legislation
which provide a more rational legal framework for an increasing
range of individual economic activity.
It must be re-emphasised that the aggrandisement of individual
values just suggested stands out mainly in relation to the traditional
order which the colonial r6gime at least attempted to nurture. While
it seems clear to me that legal developments in Ghana since
independence have moved the individual closer to the centre of the
stage, he does not occupy it alone. Community values have surely
prevailed in the project for public development of the Volta Basin
and in the creation and operation of the harbour facilities at Tema,
as well as in the legal devices for national administration of stool
lands and other resources. Nevertheless, the guiding values of most
legal change in independent Ghana appear to be predominantly
individualistic.
The competition between individual and collective values is often
paralleled by that between democracy and autocracy. As Ghana's
legal development has tended to stress individualism, the legal
structuring of its basic governmental institutions has been guided by
democratic values. Popularly elected governmental bodies at both
local and national levels, the elimination of special representation
from the traditional authorities and major economic interests, the
constitutional affirmation of popular sovereignty and the entrench-
ment of certain constitutional devices to permit their change only
after a referendum of the people, all these reflect an option for
democratic principles. On the other hand, the attraction of autocratic
34 Republican Constitution, art. 1.
William Burnett Harvey
direction may be seen in the declared preference for a one party
system, in the move, which was firmly rejected by Dr. Nkrumah, to
make him President for life, and in the provisions of the Republican
Constitution, thus far unused, granting special legislative powers to
the first President of Ghana.3 It may be fairly said that thus far the
democratic values have predominated in the formal structuring of
legal and governmental institutions, while the autocratic values have
tended to determine the realities of political life in Ghana. In this
respect, of course, Ghana's experience is not unique. In most of
the new countries, the leadership group which has directed the
successful drive toward independence has tended to claim a dominant
or exclusive role in guiding the early years of post-independence
development.
In Roscoe Pound's famous epigram that "law must be stable
and yet it cannot stand still," 10 is summed up one of the most
persistent value competitions of all legal orders. I would be inclined
to reject the notion that stability is a necessary characteristic of some
objective concept or idea of law. At the same time, I would insist
that the value of stability, of a fairly deep and firm channel to control
the currents, whirlpools and eddys of social life, has been at all
times and in all places perceived as a guiding value in law. The
sharpness of the perception, the firmness of the value acceptance
has, of course, varied with time and place. The currents of social
life always challenge to some extent the restraining channel. If the
restraint is too great, there is flood which finds or cuts a new channel
that better accommodates the pressures of the flow. One should
not press this analogy to the point of assuming, however, that the
process always runs from social pressure as cause to legal change as
effect. The analogy might be corrected by observing that a skilled
engineer can cut a new channel into which at the appropriate time
the stream may be diverted. So, to some extent at least, can the
legislator, the judge, the administrator, affect the flow of social life
by innovations in the legal order. I say to some extent because we
still know far too little about the extent of effectiveness of law
as an instrument of planned social change. I do not assume the
infinite plasticity of social life; thus I do not assume that it can be
shaped and directed fully at the will of the manipulator of the legal
technique.
At the moment, with respect to developments in Ghana since
independence, we do not need to determine where the principal
well-springs of legal change may lie-in the broad social group or
in a narrower 61ite. Our question is merely this-which value,
35 Republican Constitution, art. 55.
36 Pound, interpretations of Legal History, p. 1.
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stability or change, has dominated the legal order. The answer seems
clear indeed. Changes in the formal structure of legal power, in the
extent and variety of official functions, in the relations between
constituent elements in the pluralistic legal order, and in the various
substantive aspects of public and private law have been great. Some
of the more significant have been summarised earlier. On occasion
changes have been made too precipitately; errors have occurred which
greater deliberation would have avoided, and correctives have been
called for.
Again, however, a word of caution is needed. The force of "the
wind of change" in Ghana, to use Mr. Macmillan's felicitous phrase,
has been strong indeed but it has not been cyclonic. The changes
have been ordered within a continuing legal tradition. Only in fixing
the ultimate locus of legal power has the break with the past been
complete. The constituent elements of the old legal order have
been preserved, though the relations among them have been altered.
Models to be considered in drafting new statutes have been sought
first of all in familiar systems of law. The basic techniques of
legislation, of interpretation and of common law trial and decision
have been preserved. Nor has reliance on familiar customary
patterns been foreclosed despite the attractions of a uniform national
law.
I have attempted to articulate some of the guiding value
judgments in Ghana's legal development in the familiar terms of the
legal theorist. Other terms having their own significance have been
used by political leaders. We have heard much of the development
and expression of the African personality, in law as well as other
spheres. If such expressions have tended to suggest the postulation
of an inflexible governing concept, of an overriding doctrine, they
are refuted by the actualities of Ghana's legal development over
the past decade. That development has been peculiarly non-
doctrinaire. At the formal opening of the Ghana Law School in
January 1962 Dr. Nkrumah declared that "the law should be the
legal expression of the political, economic and social conditions of
the people and of their aims for progress." Such a relativistic and
pragmatic approach has in my judgment led to the implementation
of the value acceptances described in the evolution of the law of
Ghana since independence.
